A Primer on the Euro Breakup:Default, Exit and Devaluation as the Optimal Solution – jonathan tepper
Pas faux : The euro is like a modern day gold standard where the burden of adjustment falls on the weaker countries – Like the gold standard, the euro forces adjustment in real prices and wages instead of exchange rates. And much like the gold standard, it has a recessionary bias, where the burden of adjustment is always placed on the weak-currency country, not on the strong countries.
The solution from European politicians has been to call for more austerity, but public and private sectors can only deleverage through large current account surpluses, which is not feasible given
high external debt and low exports in the periphery. So long as periphery countries stay in the euro, they will bear the burdens of adjustment and be condemned to contraction or low growth.

Réécriture de l’histoire dans le sens qui l’arrange : The experience of emerging market countries shows that the pain of devaluation would be brief and rapid growth and recovery would follow […] grow again quickly, much like many emerging markets after defaults and devaluations (Asia 1997, Russia 1998, Argentina 2002, etc). In almost all cases, real GDP declined for only two to four quarters. Furthermore, real GDP levels rebounded to precrisis levels within two to three years and most countries were able to access international debt markets quickly.
– On parle de défauts ici, et non de sortie d’une zone monétaire.
– Seule la Thaïlande, l’Indonésie et la Malaisie ont été touchés de plein fouet : 8 ans après le pouvoir d’achat par habitant n’était pas revenu au niveau d’origine
– L’Argentine a toujours des soucis causés par sa dette extérieure non réglée.
– La Russie a fait défaut et dévalué, mais a pas mal été aidée par la remontée du prix du brut juste après.
– Tant en Russie qu’en Argentine, les gens ordinaires ont perdus leurs économies.